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The claim of quantum cryptography has always been that
it can provide protocols that are unconditionally secure, that
is, for which the security does not depend on any restriction
on the time, space or technology available to the cheaters.
We show that this claim does not hold for any quantum bit
commitment protocol. Since many cryptographic tasks use
bit commitment as a basic primitive, this result implies a
severe setback for quantum cryptography. The model used
encompasses all reasonable implementations of quantum bit
commitment protocols in which the participants have not met
before, including those that make use of the theory of special
relativity.
1994 PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 42.50.Dv, 89.70.+c
a. Introduction. Quantum cryptography is often as-
sociated with a cryptographic application called key dis-
tribution [1,2] and it has achieved success in this area [5].
However, other applications of quantum mechanics to
cryptography have also been considered and a basic cryp-
tographic primitive called bit commitment, the main fo-
cus of this letter, was at the basis of most if not all of
these other applications [3,6,15,5].
In a concrete example of bit commitment, a party, Al-
ice, writes a bit b on a piece of paper and puts it into a
safe. She gives the safe to another party, Bob, but keeps
the key. The objective of this scheme, and of bit com-
mitment in general, is that Alice cannot change her mind
about the value of the bit b, but meanwhile Bob cannot
determine the bit b. At a later time, if Alice wants to
unveil b to Bob, she gives the key to Bob.
In 1993, a protocol was proposed to realize bit com-
mitment in the framework of quantum mechanics, and
the unconditional security (see sections b and c) of this
protocol has been generally accepted for quite some time.
However, this result turned out to be wrong. The non
security of this protocol, called the BCJL protocol, was
realized in the fall of 1995 [12]. After this discovery, Bras-
sard, Cre´peau and other researchers have tried to find
alternative protocols [4]. Some protocols were based on
the theory of special relativity. For additional informa-
tion about the history of the result see [5]. See also [11].
Here it is shown that an unconditionally secure bit
commitment protocol is impossible, unless a computing
device, such as a beam splitter, a quantum gate, etc. can
be simultaneously trusted by both participants in the
protocol. This encompasses any protocol based on the
theory of special relativity. A preliminary version of the
proof appeared in [13].
b. The model for quantum protocols. It is neither
possible in this letter to describe in detail a model for
two-party quantum protocols, nor is it is useful for the
purpose of this letter. The following description includes
all that is necessary for our proof.
In our model, a two-party quantum protocol is exe-
cuted on a system HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE where HA and HB
correspond to two areas, one on Alice’s side and one on
Bob’s side, and HE corresponds to the environment. We
adopt the “decoherence” point of view in which a mixed
state ρ ofHA⊗HB is really the reduced state ofHA⊗HB
entangled with the environment HE , the total system
HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE always being in a pure state |ψ〉. The
systems HA and HB contain only two dimensional quan-
tum registers. Higher dimensional systems can be con-
structed out of two dimensional systems. Alice and Bob
can execute any unitary transformation on their respec-
tive system. In particular, they can introduce new quan-
tum registers in a fixed state |0〉. States that correspond
to different number of registers can be in linear super-
position. Any mode of quantum communication can be
adopted between Alice and Bob.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to
binary outcome measurements. The environment is of
the form HE = HS ⊗HE,A ⊗HE,B where HS = HS,A ⊗
HS,B is a system that stores classical bits that have been
transmitted from HS,A on Alice’s side to HS,B on Bob’s
side or vice versa, and HE,A and HE,B store untransmit-
ted classical bits that are kept on Alice’s side and Bob’s
side respectively. To execute a binary outcome measure-
ment, a participant P ∈ {A,B}, where A and B stand for
Alice and Bob respectively, introduces a quantum regis-
ter in a fixed state |0〉. The participant P entangles this
register with the measured system initially in a state |φ〉
and obtains a new state of the form α |0〉|φ0〉+ β |1〉|φ1〉.
Then, he sends the new quantum register away to a mea-
suring apparatus inHE,P which amplifies and stores each
component |x〉 as a complex state |x〉(E,P ). The resulting
state is α |0〉(E,P )|φ0〉+ β |1〉(E,P )|φ1〉. Similarly, to gen-
erate a random bit one simply maps |0〉 into α |0〉+ β |1〉
and sends the register away in some part ofHE,P that will
amplify and store it as a state α |0〉(E,P )+β |1〉(E,P ). The
transmission of a classical bit x from Alice to Bob is rep-
resented by a transformation that maps |x〉(E,A)|0〉(E,B)
into |x〉(S,A)|x〉(S,B). A similar transformation exists for
the transmission of a classical bit from Bob to Alice.
Now, let us assume that the total system is in a super-
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position
∑
ξS ,ξA,ξB
α(ξS ,ξA,ξB) |ξS , ξA, ξB〉(E)|φ(ξS ,ξA,ξB)〉
where |ξS , ξA, ξB〉(E) corresponds to the random bi-
nary string stored in the environment with probability
|α(ξS ,ξA,ξB)|2 and |φ(ξS ,ξA,ξB)〉 is the corresponding col-
lapsed state of HA ⊗HB. The participant P can “read”
the strings ξP and ξS and then choose the next action,
measurements, etc. accordingly, but the allowed trans-
formations must behave as if a collapse into the state
|φ(ξS ,ξA,ξB)〉 has really occurred.
c. Unconditional security and quantum bit commit-
ment protocols. To realize bit commitment in the frame-
work of quantum mechanics, the bit b that Alice has in
mind must be encoded into a state |ψb〉 of HA ⊗ HB ⊗
HE through a procedure commit(b). A bit commit-
ment protocol must also include an optional procedure
unveil(|ψb〉) that can be used to return to Bob either the
value of the bit b or, occasionally when Alice attempts
to cheat, an inconclusive result denoted ⊥. The protocol
is correct if the procedure unveil always return b on |ψb〉
when both participants are honest.
Now, the encoding that is defined above does not al-
ways make sense when Alice cheats. Alice might act
without having any specific bit b in mind during the
procedure commit, so as to choose it later. Given a
fixed strategy used by Alice, let |ψ′〉 be the state cre-
ated by the associated modified procedure commit′. We
denote p(b |not ⊥) the probability that unveil returns
b on |ψ′〉 given that it has not returned ⊥. Alice can
certainly choose the probability p(b | not ⊥). This can
be done via an honest encoding by choosing bit b with
probability p(b | not ⊥). However, after the procedure
commit′, Alice should not be able to change her mind
about p(b | not ⊥). Let unveil′ be a procedure unveil
modified by a dishonest Alice. Now, denote p′(b | not ⊥)
as the probability that unveil′ returns b on |ψ′〉 given that
it does not return ⊥. The state |ψ′〉 perfectly binds Alice
to p(b | not ⊥) if every procedure unveil′ either returns
⊥ with probability 1 or else returns b with probability
p′(b | not ⊥) = p(b | not ⊥). In this case, we also say
that |ψ′〉 is perfectly binding.
The encoding b 7→ |ψb〉 makes sense when Alice is hon-
est, but it can be modified by a dishonest Bob. Let
η = (ξB , ξS) be the random classical information stored
in HE,B ⊗ HS and available to Bob after this encod-
ing. Let |ψb,η〉 be the corresponding collapsed state of
the system HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE,A. Denote ρB(|ψb,η〉) =
TrHA⊗HE,A(|ψb,η〉〈ψb,η|) the reduced density matrix of
HB given η. Let us define F (η) = 0 if η determines a
single value of the bit b, otherwise let F (η) be the fi-
delity [9] between ρB(|ψ0,η〉) and ρB(|ψ1,η〉). The fidelity
is never greater than 1 and is equal to 1 if and only if the
two density matrices are identical. The modified encod-
ing is said to be perfectly concealing if the random string
η provides no information about b and the expected value
of F (η) is 1. This corresponds to the fact that a dishonest
Bob should not be able to determine the bit b. A proto-
col is perfectly secure if, (1) when Alice is honest, even if
Bob cheats, the resulting encoding is perfectly conceal-
ing, and, (2) when Bob is honest, even if Alice cheats,
the resulting encoding is perfectly binding.
Note that it is generally accepted that a perfectly se-
cure bit commitment protocol is impossible. However,
another almost as interesting level of security is possible.
Consider a protocol with some security parameter n. For
example, the security parameter n could correspond to
the number of photons that must be transmitted. An
encoding with parameter n is said to be concealing if, by
an increase of the parameter n, it can be made arbitrar-
ily close to perfectly concealing. Similarly, a state |ψ〉
with an implicit parameter n is said to be binding if by
an increase of the parameter n it can be made arbitrarily
close to be perfectly binding. A protocol with parame-
ter n is secure if (1) the state |ψ〉 returned by commit
is binding when Bob is honest and (2) the encoding is
concealing when Alice is honest. This is the kind of secu-
rity that we expect in quantum cryptography. Further-
more, in quantum cryptography, we want any desired
properties to hold even against a cheater with unlimited
computational power! This means that there should be
no restriction on the amount of time, space or technol-
ogy available to the cheater. A property that holds even
against such a cheater is said to hold unconditionally. In
quantum cryptography, we want unconditionally secure
protocols. This does not mean that we want perfectly
secure protocols.
d. The BB84 quantum bit commitment protocol. We
say that an encoding b 7→ |ψb〉 is a bit commitment en-
coding if it is concealing and |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 bind Alice to
0 and 1 respectively. It can be shown that even if both
participants are honest, no protocol that is based on clas-
sical communication between Alice and Bob can create
a bit commitment encoding. So, it is of interest that a
two-party quantum protocol was proposed in 1984 that
realizes a bit commitment encoding when both partici-
pants are honest [1]. The protocol fails when Alice cheats.
In fact, the authors themselves have first explained their
protocol together with Alice’s strategy.
In the BB84 coding scheme (which is not a bit commit-
ment) a bit is coded either in a so-called rectilinear basis
( |0〉+, |1〉+ ) or in the diagonal basis ( |0〉×, |1〉× ), where
|0〉× = 1/
√
2(|0〉+ + |1〉+) and |1〉× = 1/
√
2(|0〉+− |1〉+).
In the commit procedure of the BB84 quantum bit com-
mitment protocol, Alice creates a string of random bits
w = w1 . . . wn. Then she codes each bit wi in the BB84
coding scheme, always using the rectilinear basis θ = +
if she wants to commit a 0 and the diagonal basis θ = ×
if she wants to commit a 1. She sends these registers
to Bob. Then, Bob chooses a string of random bases
θˆ = θˆ1 . . . θˆn ∈ {+,×}n, measures the register i in the
basis θˆi and notes the outcomes wˆi. In the unveil proce-
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dure, Alice has simply to announce the string w. Bob
can determine the bit b by looking at the positions i
where wi 6= wˆi. Bob knows that at each of these po-
sitions θ 6= θˆi, and he knows the bases θˆi. Any of these
positions can be used to determine θ. If two of these posi-
tions reveal different values for θ, Bob interprets it as an
inconclusive result. The encoding is concealing because
both b = 0 and b = 1 correspond to the same fully mixed
density matrix on Bob’s side. Also, the state after the
commit procedure is binding because in order to deceive
Bob Alice would have to guess exactly the bits obtained
by Bob when θˆi 6= θ. These bits are perfectly random.
Therefore, she would only succeed with a probability that
goes to 0 when n increases. Note that unconditional se-
curity does not mean a perfectly secure protocol.
Now, we present Alice’s strategy against the BB84 bit
commitment protocol. In our model, for each random bit
wi, Alice creates the state:
1/
√
2(|0〉(E,A)θ |0〉(B)θ + |1〉(E,A)θ |1〉(B)θ ) (1)
where the bit wi is coded in the register to the left. For
simplicity, we have assumed that the basis θ is used for
both registers. A dishonest Alice executes the honest
commit algorithm for b = 0, except that she never sends
anything away to the environment. In other words, for
each position i, the state (1) becomes the state:
1/
√
2(|0〉(A)+ |0〉(B)+ + |1〉(A)+ |1〉(B)+ ). (2)
Note that the states (1) and (2) are formally identical.
Only the underlying systems are different. Nevertheless,
this is cheating because now there exists a unitary trans-
formation that Alice can execute on HA that will trans-
form this state into the state:
1/
√
2(|0〉(A)× |0〉(B)× + |1〉(A)× |1〉(B)× ), (3)
which is the state that she would have created with a 1
in mind. In this example, it turns out that the trans-
formation is the identity transformation because these
two states are one and the same state, but in general the
cheater will have a non trivial transformation to execute.
e. The proof. It is very easy to build a secure bit com-
mitment protocol in which the initial state is already the
outcome of a bit commitment encoding. So the follow-
ing proof for the impossibility of bit commitment requires
an assumption on the initial state. For simplicity we deal
only with protocols where initially all quantum registers
are set to |0〉 and there is no entanglement with the en-
vironment. We prove that no quantum bit commitment
protocol that starts in this state is unconditionally se-
cure, unless a computing device such as a beam splitter
can be trusted by both participants simultaneously. In
our proof we assume that the protocol is secure against
Bob. (Otherwise, the protocol is not secure and we are
done). The proof has three main steps. First, we de-
scribe Alice’s strategy in a modified procedure commit′
and Bob’s strategy in a modified procedure commit′′.
Second, we consider Bob’s strategy in commit′′ and use
the assumption that the protocol is secure against Bob
to obtain that the expected value of the fidelity between
the density matrices on Bob’s side after commit′ is arbi-
trarily close to 1. Third, we show that this implies that a
procedure unveil′ modified by Alice allows her to cheat
after commit′.
The first step. In the BB84 example, Alice’s strategy
in a procedure commit′ was to choose b = 0 and to never
send a register away to the environment. However, in this
particular example there was no classical communication
from Alice to Bob. In the general case, in the modified
procedure commit′, Alice chooses b = 0 and never sends
a register away to the environment except when this reg-
ister contains a classical bit that she must transmit to
Bob via the environment, using the phone for instance.
Bob in commit′′ does as Alice in commit′, that is, he
never sends a register away to the environment unless it
is required for classical communication. So, HE,A is not
used in commit′ and HE,B not used in commit
′′.
The second step. Let γ be the random string stored in
HS after commit
′. Let |ψ′b,γ〉 be the corresponding col-
lapsed state of the remaining system HA ⊗HB ⊗HE,B.
We want to show that the expected value of the fidelity
F ′(γ) between the reduced density matrices ρB(|ψ′b,γ〉)
for HB⊗HE,B in commit′ is arbitrarily close to 1. After
commit′′, the same random string γ is stored in HS , but
the corresponding collapsed state |ψ′′b,γ〉 is now stored in
HE,A ⊗ HA ⊗ HB . However, as for the states (1) and
(2) of the BB84 example, the state |ψ′′b,γ〉 is formally
identical to the state |ψ′b,γ〉. Also, because in commit′
HE,A has been replaced by a subsystem of HA, a par-
tial trace over HA in commit
′ corresponds formally to
a partial trace over HA ⊗HE,A in commit′′. Therefore,
the density matrices ρB(|ψ′b,γ〉) in commit′ are identical
to the corresponding density matrices ρB(|ψ′′b,γ〉) for the
system HB in commit
′′. Also, in commit′′ the strings
η = (ξB, ξS) and the string γ = ξS correspond to a same
collapse because ξB is the empty string. The expected
value of F ′(γ) = F (η) (see section c) must be arbitrarily
close to 1, otherwise Bob succeeds in commit′′ and this
contradicts our assumption.
The third step. For simplicity we first do the case where
the expected value of F ′(γ) is 1, that is, the density ma-
trices are always identical. In this case, Alice can unveil
the bit b = 1 because the work of [8] implies that, if
ρB(|ψ′0,γ〉) = ρB(|ψ′1,γ〉)
def
= ρB, there exists a unitary
transformation on Alice’s side which maps |ψ′0,γ〉 into
|ψ′1,γ〉. Consider the respective Schmidt decomposition
[8,14] of |ψ′0,γ〉 and |ψ′1,γ〉:
|ψ′0,γ〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|e(0)i 〉 ⊗ |fi〉
|ψ′1,γ〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|e(1)i 〉 ⊗ |fi〉.
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In the above formula, λi are eigenvalues of the three den-
sity matrices ρB , ρA(|ψ′0,γ〉) and ρA(|ψ′1,γ〉). The fact
that these three density matrices share the same positive
eigenvalues with the same multiplicity is a direct con-
sequence of the Schmidt decomposition theorem [8,14].
The states |e(b)i 〉 and |fi〉 are respectively eigenstates of
ρA(|ψ′b,γ〉) and ρB associated with the same eigenvalue
λi. The coefficients
√
λi are real numbers, but any phase
can be included in the choice of |e(b)i 〉. Clearly, the same
unitary transformation that maps |e(0)i 〉 into |e(1)i 〉 also
maps |ψ′0,γ〉 into |ψ′1,γ〉. Alice can compute the states
e
(b)
i and thus this unitary transformation with an arbi-
trary level of precision. So, Alice can cheat when the two
density matrices on Bob’s side are always identical.
Now, we do the case where the expected value of F ′(γ)
is not 1 but arbitrarily close to 1. Note that F ′(γ) > 0
is the fidelity between ρB(|ψ′0,γ〉) and ρB(|ψ′1,γ〉). Any
state |ψ01〉 of the overall system such that ρB(|ψ01〉) =
ρB(|ψ′0,γ〉) is called a purification of the density matrix
ρB(|ψ′0,γ〉). Because |ψ′1,γ〉 is a purification of ρB(|ψ′1,γ〉),
Uhlmann’s theorem [9] says that there exists a purifica-
tion |ψ01〉 of ρB(|ψ′0,γ〉) such that
〈ψ01|ψ′1,γ〉 ≥ F ′(γ) (4)
The fact that |ψ01〉 is a purification of ρB(|ψ′0,γ〉) implies
that Alice in unveil′ can transform |ψ′0,γ〉 into |ψ01〉, as
in the case where the density matrices are identical, and
then continue with the honest unveil. Inequality 4 im-
plies that the probability pγ that unveil
′ returns 1 on
|ψ′0,γ〉 is greater than f(F ′(γ)) for some function f(z)
such that limz→1 f(z) = 1 (more details are given in [12]).
This means that Alice can change the bit b that she un-
veils to Bob from 0 to 1 with a probability that goes to
1 as the expected value of F ′(γ) goes to 1.
One key point is that the algorithm used by the dis-
honest participant in commit′ or commit′′ is formally
identical to the algorithm used by the same but honest
participant in commit. Therefore, no verification what-
soever, including any verification based on measurement
of time delay and the theory of special relativity, can be
used by the honest participant in commit′ or commit′′
to detect such a cheater. This concludes the proof.
f. Conclusions. Because we have shown that bit com-
mitment is impossible, we cannot hope to realize crypto-
graphic primitives or applications which are known to be
powerful enough to obtain bit commitment. On the other
hand, there might exist secure protocols for coin tossing
and most multi-party computations [10,7] because it is
not known how to build bit commitment on top of them.
Note that some tasks might not be powerful enough to
obtain bit commitment and yet be impossible. What are
the fundamental principles that make some tasks possi-
ble and other tasks impossible? One could propose that
all the tasks which involve only two parties are impossi-
ble to explain why quantum key distribution is possible
and bit commitment impossible. However, there might
be other principles involved. For instance, in bit com-
mitment an asymmetry is created. It could be that only
the asymmetrical tasks are impossible. In this case, coin
tossing would be possible. What tasks are possible is a
fundamental question which yet remains to be answered.
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